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Abstract
Fearful faces are believed to be prioritized in visual perception. However, it is unclear whether the processing of low-level fa-
cial features alone can facilitate such prioritization or whether higher-level mechanisms also contribute. We examined po-
tential biases for fearful face perception at the levels of perceptual decision-making and perceptual confidence. We controlled
for lower-level visual processing capacity by titrating luminance contrasts of backward masks, and the emotional intensity of
fearful, angry and happy faces. Under these conditions, participants showed liberal biases in perceiving a fearful face, in both
detection and discrimination tasks. This effect was stronger among individuals with reduced density in dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex, a region linked to perceptual decision-making. Moreover, participants reported higher confidence when they
accurately perceived a fearful face, suggesting that fearful faces may have privileged access to consciousness. Together, the
results suggest that mechanisms in the prefrontal cortex contribute to making fearful face perception special.
Key words: fearful face perception; perceptual decision-making; metacognition; dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLFPC); voxel-
based morphometry (VBM)
Introduction
Many studies suggest that fearful face perception is special, in
that a fearful face is easier or quicker to be perceived than
faces with neutral or other emotional expressions. For in-
stance, some studies have shown that fearful faces were more
likely to be perceived when attention was directed away (e.g.
attentional bink; Milders et al., 2006; Stein et al., 2009). Other
studies have shown that fearful faces are more resistant to
suppression by visual noise or dichoptic suppression (Yang
et al., 2007; Amting et al., 2010; Stein et al., 2010, 2014; Stienen
and de Gelder, 2011).
Yet, it is unclear if such prioritized perception of fearful faces
is merely due to lower-level visual processing. Although previous
studies carefully controlled for low-level physical features such
as luminance contrast and spatial frequency, bottom-up process-
ing of local features such as the increased eye white exposure
may be sufficient to explain why fearful faces are easier to be
seen. For instance, Yang et al. (2007) showed that fearful faces re-
sisted continuous flash suppression better than other faces. But
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importantly, the effect was preserved even when the faces were
inverted. These results seem to be compatible with the interpret-
ation that it was local features rather than Gestalt facial process-
ing that account for the prioritized perception of fearful faces.
On the other hand, it is also clear that high-level mechanisms
contribute to visual perception in general. For example, it has
been shown that mechanisms in the prefrontal cortex contribute
to our perception by forming perceptual decisions, that is to stat-
istically evaluate the most likely identity of the perceived object
given the accumulating sensory evidence encoded in lower sen-
sory areas (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). This highlights the import-
ance of examining high-level processings in an attempt to
thoroughly understand the mechanism underlying our visual
perception. Yet, while the low-level mechanisms have been the
focus in previous studies (Yang et al., 2007), the contribution of
high-level mechanisms in the fearful face perception has been
rarely investigated. We speculated that these high-level mech-
anisms may also contribute to prioritize fearful face perception,
by biasing perceptual decisions in favor of fearful faces.
Another high-level mechanism involved in visual perception is
metacognition, with which we monitor our ongoing perceptual de-
cisions and derive a level of subjective confidence when we are
likely to be correct. It has been shown that fearful faces are more
likely to reach conscious perception (Yang et al., 2007; Amting et al.,
2010; Stein et al., 2010, 2014; Stienen and de Gelder, 2011), which in
turn has been linked to metacognition (Lau and Rosenthal, 2011;
Ko and Lau, 2012). Thus, we also speculated that fearful faces may
have a prioritized access to the metacognitive system, such that
fearful faces may be perceived with higher confidence.
The possibility that high-level mechanisms contribute to pri-
oritize fearful face perception is not incompatible with low-level
accounts. Given that fearful faces could forecast approaching
dangers in the environment, there may be a survival advantage
to prioritize perception of fearful faces at both the higher and
lower levels.
Therefore, in this study, we examined potential biases for
fearful face perception at the levels of perceptual decision-
making and metacognition. To selectively examine biases due
to high-level mechanisms, we carefully controlled for lower-
visual processing sensitivity by titrating the luminance con-
trasts of backward masks, as well as the emotional intensity ex-
pressed in fearful, angry and happy faces. We also used voxel-
based morphometry (VBM) to examine the involvement of
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which plays an import-
ant role in both perceptual decision-making (Kim and Shadlen,
1999; Leon and Shadlen, 1999; Heekeren et al., 2006; Philiastides
et al., 2011) and metacognition (Lau and Passingham, 2006; Lau
and Rosenthal, 2011; Fleming et al., 2012).
Methods
Participants
Forty-one students (17 males, mean age 23.2) from Columbia
University participated in this study. All participants were re-
cruited to complete two sessions conducted on two separate days,
once with the male image set and once with the female image set
(order counterbalanced; see Stimuli for details). Yet, only 24 par-
ticipants completed both sessions. For the remaining 17 partici-
pants, 13 were tested only with the female face image set and 4
were tested only with the male face image set. Data collection was
stopped after the number of participants who completed both ses-
sions met the sample size which was predetermined based on the
previously reported similar psychophysics experiments (Koizumi
et al., 2015). In 24 out of the 41 participants (14 completed both
image sets, 2 completed only the male image set and 8 completed
only the female image set), we had access to structural MRI
images of their brains (10 males, mean age 23.7) from another ex-
periment not mentioned here, thus their data were further used
in VBM analysis. All participants received $10–15 per hr of partici-
pation. Participants completed a written informed consent form
prior to participation. The study was approved by the Columbia
University’s Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects.
Stimuli
We used the NimStim stimulus set (Tottenham et al., 2009) to
select the images of fearful, angry, happy and neutral faces,
posed by one male and one female models (model number 34M
and 07F) [to demonstrate in Figure 1, another model (03F) with
publication permission was used]. Only the images with open
mouth were selected so that participants could not perform the
tasks solely based on whether the mouth was open in that
image. The images were morphed from neutral to fearful, angry
and happy expressions of the same model using the Norrkross
MorphX software version 2.11. Each morph sequence (e.g. neu-
tral to fear) had 99 intervals, producing a continuum of 100
images with the gradual increment of emotional intensity. The
morphed images were converted into gray scale, and their lumi-
nance contrast, spatial frequency spectrum and overall lumi-
nosity were equated across the entire image set with the SHINE
toolbox (Willenbockel et al., 2010) implemented in Matlab. The
image contrast was 30% of the original images. The size of the
image was 8.4  6.5 in visual angle with a viewing distance of
75 cm.
The face image was followed by a mask (see Experimental
Design, Figure 1) so as to manipulate the task difficulty but the
mask presentation was not meant to completely abolish aware-
ness of the face. The mask images were created by modifying
the to-be-masked face images from that trial in a manner that
the phase of face stimuli was scrambled using Matlab while
maintaining other physical properties (e.g. luminosity and spa-
tial frequency spectrum).
Experimental design
Detection calibration. Participants first went through Detection
Calibration, in which they performed fearful, angry and happy
face detection tasks, in orders counterbalanced across partici-
pants. The aim of calibration was to identify a threshold-level
intensity for each emotion so that the participants would per-
form equally well (i.e. same sensitivity) in detecting faces with
three different emotions. This allowed us to access detection
biases while making sure that such biases were not due to dif-
ferences in the emotional intensity between the faces. During
calibration, we titrated the emotional intensity of the target
face (see Stimuli earlier) with the Quest threshold estimation
procedure (Watson and Pelli, 1983), so that the participants
were expected to perform at an accuracy of about 75% in a 2-
interval forced-choice (2IFC) detection task (details later). Each
task had 16 practice trials and 96 calibration trials. The calibra-
tion trials consist of two randomly interleaved Quest sequences
of 48 trials each. Each Quest sequence independently estimated
the threshold emotional intensity, and the average of the two
estimates was used in the following Discrimination Calibration
and experimental tasks. The means of morph intensity for fear,
angry and happy face were M¼ 48.63 6 s.d. 27.21,
M¼ 51.386 27.29, M¼ 40.23619.50, respectively. A one-way
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analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main effect
of Emotion [F(2, 39)¼ 6.88, P¼ 0.003, partial g2¼ 0.26], which was
due to that the calibrated morphed intensity was higher for an
anger face (P¼ 0.002, Bonferroni corrected) and tended to be
higher for a fearful face (P¼ 0.06), relative to a happy face.
On each trial, one neutral face as well as one target emo-
tional face (fearful, happy or angry, in different blocks) were
presented consecutively in random order. A trial started with a
face (33 ms) followed by a mask (99 ms). After a blank (750 ms), a
second face (33 ms) was followed by another mask (99 ms). The
mask contrast was matched with the contrast of face image and
was kept constant throughout Detection Calibration. To avoid
the overlap of locations between the two faces, the location of
the first face was jittered from the center of screen to a random
direction by a Euclidean distance of 1.2 degree, and the location
of the second face was jittered by the same distance to a differ-
ent direction. Immediately after the second mask, the key-
assignment appeared in the lower screen. Participants used 1-
or 2-key to report the perceived sequence of faces, i.e. whether
the emotional face came first, or the neutral face came first. The
key assignment was counterbalanced across the participants.
When a response was registered or a 5 s period elapsed from
the offset of the second mask, a fixation cross (0.35) was pre-
sented for 250 ms, followed by the next trial.
Discrimination calibration. With the emotional intensity levels
determined in Detection Calibration, participants went through
Discrimination Calibration in which they performed three tasks
to discriminate fearful/angry, fearful/happy and happy/angry
emotion pairs, in orders counterbalanced across participants.
The aim of this additional calibration was to identify a thresh-
old contrast for the backward mask for each emotion pair, so
that the participants would discriminate each pair with similar
accuracy. The reason is that even when each emotional face is
similarly detectable, discrimination between each face pair may
still show different sensitivities. The luminance contrast of the
backward mask was titrated with the Quest threshold estima-
tion procedure (Watson and Pelli, 1983) to achieve an accuracy
of 75% in a 2IFC task. The procedure was similar to Detection
Calibration. In each calibration task, a total of 96 trials were div-
ided into two randomly interleaved Quest sequences of 48 trials.
Each sequence independently estimated the threshold mask
contrast, and the average of the two estimates was used in the
experimental Discrimination Tasks.
The means of calibrated Michelson contrast for the back-
ward mask in the discrimination tasks with fearful/angry,
fearful/happy and happy/angry pairs were M¼ 34.066 s.d. 13.60,
M¼ 26.966 13.82, M¼ 34.62613.78, respectively. A one-way
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Emotion [F(2, 39) ¼
5.65, P ¼ 0.007, partial g2¼ 0.23], which was due to that the mask
contrast for the discrimination task was significantly lower for
the fearful/happy pair compared with the fearful/angry pair as
well as the happy/angry pair (P¼ 0.033, P¼ 0.019, respectively).
Detection tasks. With the estimated threshold intensity for
each emotion, participants went through three Detection Tasks
(fearful/neutral, angry/neutral and happy/neutral) and three
Discrimination Tasks (fearful/angry, fearful/happy and happy/
angry), in orders counterbalanced across participants. The mask
with the same contrast as the face images were used in the
Detection Tasks, and the mask contrasts estimated in
Discrimination Calibration were used in the Discrimination
Tasks. In Detection Tasks (Figure 1A), participants were pre-
sented with either a neutral face or an emotional face express-
ing fearful, angry or happy emotions. Each trial started with a
face (33 ms) followed by a mask (99 ms). Immediately after the
mask, a key assignment was shown in the lower portion of the
screen. Participants used 1- or 2-key to indicate which of the
two face images (e.g. fearful or neutral) was perceived. The key
assignment was counterbalanced across participants. After 200
ms from the response, a key assignment for confidence rating
was indicated in the lower portion of the screen. Participants
rated how confident they were that their response was accur-
ate. They used the 1- to 4-keys on a keyboard to indicate from
lowest to highest confidence. When confidence was rated or 5 s
elapsed from the mask offset, a fixation cross (0.35 angle) was
presented for 250 ms, followed by the next trial. The location
was matched for the face and mask images within a trial but
was jittered by a distance of 1.2 degree in a random direction
across trials.
Discrimination tasks. The procedure for the Discrimination
Tasks (Figure 1B) was similar to those of the Detection Tasks.
On each trial, participants were presented with one of the face
images from the emotion pair in that task (e.g. fearful/happy).
They indicated their perceptual responses (e.g. fearful) and con-
fidence levels in the same manner as in the Detection Tasks.
Analyses
Behavioral analyses. To assess perceptual sensitivity, d’a was cal-
culated for the Detection Tasks and Discrimination Tasks with
Fig. 1. Schematic depiction of a trial sequence for (A) the Detection Tasks and (B) the Discrimination Tasks. (A) An example of a trial in the Detection Task, where either
an emotional face (fearful in this case) or neutral face was presented. (B) An example trial in the Discrimination Task (fearful/happy in this example). For visualization
purposes, the face images here are presented with the maximum emotional intensity (i.e. 100%) and high contrast; in the experiment these parameters were titrated
to achieve near-threshold performance levels.
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standard signal detection theory (SDT) methods (Macmillan and
Creelman, 2005). We used d’a, rather than the more commonly
used d’, because d’a is adjusted for the unequal variances of the
internal response distributions for the target (e.g. fearful face)
and noise (e.g. neutral face), which is often observed in detec-
tion tasks (Macmillan and Creelman, 2005). Criterion measure,
c, was also calculated for Detection Tasks and Discrimination
Tasks with SDT methods (Macmillan and Creelman, 2005). In
the subsequent analyses, the performance with the female and
male image sets were combined for the participants who com-
pleted the experiment with both image sets, as they were gener-
ally similar to each other (Supplementary Tables S1–S3) unless
otherwise stated in Results.
To examine metacognitive performance in the
Discrimination Tasks, we calculated meta-d’ for each response
type (e.g. response of perceiving a fearful face), which quantifies
how well confidence ratings track perceptual accuracy over tri-
als (Maniscalco and Lau, 2012, 2014) with a code implemented
in Matlab (http://www.columbia.edu/bsm2105/type2sdt/fit_rs_
meta_d_MLE.m). Meta-d’ was not calculated for the Detection
Tasks, given that there remain some methodological issues to
be solved in such calculation (Maniscalco and Lau, 2014),
namely that the unequal variance assumption mentioned ear-
lier is unlikely to be met for detection tasks.
VBM analyses. Structural brain images were preprocessed with
SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) in a similar manner as
previous studies (Fleming et al., 2010; McCurdy et al., 2013): the
T1 scan images were segmented into gray matter, white matter
and cerebrospinal fluid. To enhance accuracy of intersubject
alignment, the gray matter images were aligned and warped to
a template which was iteratively modified with the VBM
diffeomorphic anatomical registration through exponentiated
lie algebra (DARTEL) algorithm (Ashburner, 2007). This DARTEL
template was registered to Montreal Neurological Institute
stereotactic space, and the gray matter images were modulated
while their tissue volumes were preserved. A Gaussian kernel of
8 mm full width at half-maximum was used to smooth the
images.
Given our a priori hypotheses, we selected regions of interest
(ROIs) in DLPFC and Amygdala (Figure 4A). DLPFC was selected
based on previous literature showing the brain sites important
for perceptual decision-making (Heekeren et al., 2006;
Philiastides et al., 2011). Amygdala was selected based on the lit-
erature showing its primary role in fearful face perception
(Morris et al., 1996; Adolphs, 2008; Fusar-Poli et al., 2009). The ROI
for Amygdala was defined using wfu PickAtlas Tool (http://fmri.
wfubmc.edu/software/PickAtlas). For the localization of DLPFC,
the masks covering Brodmann’s areas (BA) 9 and 46 were cre-
ated separately for the left and right hemispheres, using wfu
PickAtlas Tool. Gray Matter density within each ROI was calcu-
lated and extracted using SPM8 and Matlab (7.10.0). The calcu-
lated values were adjusted for the effects of total brain volume,
gender and age and were sent to the subsequent analyses.
Results
Detection tasks
First we analyzed perceptual sensitivity, d’a (Figure 2A), in three
Detection Tasks with fearful, angry and happy faces. A one-way
ANOVA with Emotion (fearful, angry and happy) as a within-
subject-factor showed no significant main effect [F(2, 39)¼ 2.32,
P¼ 0.11, partial g2¼0.11], indicating that detection d’a did not
differ across the tasks. This means that perceptual sensitivity
was successfully equated in Detection Calibration.
For detection criteria (Figure 2B), a one-way ANOVA showed
a significant main effect of Emotion [F(2, 39)¼ 7.05, P¼ 0.002,
partial g2¼0.27]: criteria in the fearful face Detection Task was
more liberal (i.e. smaller value) than in the angry face Detection
Task (P¼ 0.04) and happy face Detection Task (P¼ 0.002). This
liberal bias in fearful face detection was also apparent in the
analyses of hit rate (HR) and false alarm rate (FAR) (Figure 2C
and D, respectively). For HR, a one-way ANOVA revealed a sig-
nificant main effect of Emotion [F(2, 39)¼ 4.73, P¼ 0.01, partial
g2¼0.20], which was due to that HR was higher in detecting a
fearful face than a happy face (P¼ 0.02).
Likewise, for FAR, there was a significant main effect of
Emotion [F(2, 39)¼ 4.68, P¼ 0.02, partial g2¼ 0.19], which was
due to that FAR in detecting a fearful face was higher than de-
tecting an angry face (P¼ 0.01).
Taken together, these results show that participants were
more likely to report perceiving a ‘fearful’ face in the context of
fearful face detection, regardless of whether a fearful face was
physically presented.
Given one earlier study (Rahnev et al., 2011), one could sug-
gest a somewhat trivializing account for the currently
observed liberal bias in fearful face detection: Rahnev et al.
(2011) showed that liberal criteria can be due to a large trial-
by-trial variance of the internal perceptual response. If we as-
sume the detection criterion is constant across task condi-
tions, when the variance of internal response is large, this
could mean that the response may frequently cross the detec-
tion criterion, leading to many ‘yes’ responses. Thus the
observed liberal criterion for fearful face detection may be be-
cause fearful faces were associated with higher variance for
the internal perceptual response.
However, analyses on the internal response variability did
not support this account (Rahnev et al., 2011). Specifically, we
examined the degree to which the variance of target distribu-
tion (emotional faces) was different from the variance of noise
distribution (neutral faces) in each Detection Task. The ratio of
the two variances is reflected by slope of the standardized re-
ceiver operating characteristics (z-ROC) curves (Macmillan and
Creelman, 2005). Thus, a slope value smaller than 1 indicates a
larger variance for the signal than for the noise distribution. A
one-way ANOVA on the estimated slope revealed a marginally
significant main effect of Emotion [F(2, 39)¼ 2.70, P¼ 0.08]. This
effect was due to that the slope relatively larger (i.e. closer to 1,
where slope¼ 1 indicates equal variance), rather than smaller,
in the fearful face Detection Task (M¼ 0.9360.29) compared
with the Detection Tasks with happy faces (M¼ 0.8360.34) and
angry faces (M¼ 0.8960.24), although the differences were not
statistically significant (P¼ 0.75 and 0.49, respectively). These
results suggest that the internal response for a fearful face had
a relatively smaller variance, rather than a larger variance, com-
pared with the responses for happy and angry faces. These re-
sults thus suggest that a simple account based on differences in
variances of internal response between the face emotions is
unlikely.
Although the slope (i.e. the degree of unequal variance) dif-
fered across the Detection Tasks, the slope was significantly
smaller than 1 in all three tasks (P< 0.05), where slope¼ 1 indi-
cates the equality of variance between the signal and noise.
This result means that the variance of internal signal was larger
for the signal (e.g. fearful face) than for the noise (i.e. neutral
face) in all three tasks, which is a typically observed trend in a
detection task (Macmillan and Creelman, 2005). That all of the
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current Detection Tasks indeed had an unequal variance be-
tween the signal and noise highlights the need to adopt d’a, ra-
ther than d’, as a measure of sensitivity in our data set
(Macmillan and Creelman, 2005).
To further ensure that the liberal bias in fearful face
perception was not due to differences in variance for the in-
ternal responses for the different face emotions, we examined
criteria in fearful face perception in the Discrimination
Tasks. As we will report later, the variances between the two
stimuli categories were generally equal in the Discrimination
tasks.
As expected from the purpose of calibration to modulate the
perceptual sensitivity, calibrated morphing intensity of emo-
tions showed correlation with perceptual sensitivity (d’a) in the
Detection tasks. Higher intensity of a happy face was positively
correlated with d’a in the Detection task for a happy face (R ¼
0.57, P¼ 0.004), and higher intensity of an angry face was posi-
tively correlated with d’a in the Detection task for an angry face
(R¼ 0.66, P < 0.001). Additionally, d’a in the angry Detection task
was positively correlated with the intensity of a fearful face (R ¼
0.49, P ¼ 0.016). Meanwhile, the calibrated morphing intensity
did not correlate with the criteria (P> 0.16).
Discrimination tasks
For Discrimination d’a (Figure 3A), a one-way ANOVA with
Emotion Pair as a within-subject factor showed a significant
main effect [F(2, 39)¼ 7.03, P¼ 0.002, partial g2¼0.27]. This was
due to that d’a was significantly lower in the happy/angry
Discrimination Task than in the fearful/happy Discrimination
Task (Bonferroni adjusted, P¼ 0.002). Meanwhile, d’a in the fear-
ful/happy Discrimination task did not significantly differ from
the fearful/angry Discrimination tasks (P¼ 0.80). There was no
difference in d’a between the happy/angry and fearful/angry
Discrimination tasks (P¼ 0.18).
For discrimination criteria (Figure 3B), another one-way
ANOVA showed a main effect of Emotion Pair [F(2, 39)¼ 7.03,
P¼ 0.002, partial g2¼0.27]. To further examine this main effect,
we analyzed whether the mean criteria in each Discrimination
Task significantly differed from 0, where criteria¼ 0 corres-
ponds to no-bias (i.e. equally likely to make two alternative re-
sponses in a given task, such as ‘fearful’ and ‘angry’). This
analysis revealed that participants showed a significant bias to
report perceiving a fearful face (i.e. criteria smaller than 0 in
Figure 3B) in both Discrimination Tasks that involved a fearful
Fig. 2. Results from Detection Tasks. (A) Detection d’a was similar across the three Detection Tasks (fearful, angry and happy). (B) Criteria for detecting a fearful face
was significantly more liberal (i.e. smaller value) than criteria for detecting an angry or happy face. (C) Hit rate was higher when detecting a fearful than a happy face.
(D) FAR was significantly higher when detecting a fearful face than an angry face. (**P<0.01, *P<0.05).
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face (fearful/angry pair, P¼ 0.007; fearful/happy pair, P< 0.001).
Meanwhile, the analysis showed a marginally significant bias to
report perceiving a ‘happy’ face in the happy/angry
Discrimination Task (P¼ 0.052). Although the results for dis-
crimination criteria were qualitatively similar between the male
and female image sets, it was predominantly observed with the
male image set (Supplementary Table S2). To further demon-
strate the observed bias toward fearful face perception, HR and
FAR (Figure 3C and D, respectively) were averaged across the
three Discrimination Tasks. Here, HR for perception of a fearful
face was calculated as the proportion of a fearful face response
when a fearful face was presented. Similarly, HR for perception
of an angry and happy face was each calculated as the propor-
tion of an angry or happy face response when an angry or happy
face was presented, respectively. That is,
HRfearful ¼ P(respond fearful j fearful face).
HRangry ¼ P(respond angry j angry face).
HRhappy ¼ P(respond happy j happy face).
Likewise, FAR for perception of a fearful, angry and happy
face was each calculated as
FARfearful ¼ P(respond fearful j non-fearful face).
FARangry ¼ P(respond angry j non-angry face).
FARhappy ¼ P(respond happy j non-happy face).
An one-way ANOVA on HR revealed a significant main effect
of Emotion [F(2, 39)¼ 14.80, P< 0.001, partial g2¼ 0.43]. Multiple
comparisons revealed that HRfearful was significantly higher
than HRangry and HRhappy (P< 0.01). For FAR, there was also a sig-
nificant main effect of Emotion [F(2, 39)¼ 7.82, P¼ 0.001, partial
g2¼ 0.29], which was due to that FARfearful and FARangry were
significantly higher than FARhappy (P¼ 0.002, P¼ 0.006, respect-
ively). Collectively, these results suggest that participants were
likely to report perceiving a fearful face, when a fearful face was
actually presented (i.e. hit) as well as when an angry or happy
face was presented (i.e. false alarm).
Although d’a was relatively higher for the fearful/happy
Discrimination task, this unlikely explains the results in criteria
as the liberal bias in perceiving a fearful face was similarly
observed in the fearful/happy as well as in the fearful/angry
Discrimination tasks.
Unlike in the Detection Tasks, the slope of the ROC curves in
each Discrimination Task did not statistically differ from 1,
where slope¼ 1 corresponds to the equality of variance (P> 0.40).
The calibrated contrast of a backward mask showed correlation
with sensitivity (d’a) in some of the Discrimination task. The con-
trast of mask for the happy/angry Discrimination task was
Fig. 3. Results from the Discrimination Tasks. (A) Discrimination d’a was similar across the three tasks with different emotion pairs (fearful/angry, fearful/happy,
happy/angry) except that it was lower for the happy/angry Discrimination Task than for the fearful/happy Discrimination Task. (B) Criteria for the Discrimination
Tasks involving a fearful face (i.e. fearful/angry, fearful/happy) consistently showed a bias to report perceiving a fearful face. (C) Hit rate and (D) FAR also demonstrated
that participants tended to report perceiving a fearful face when they were presented with a fearful face (i.e. higher HR) as well as when they were presented with a
non-fearful (happy/angry) face (i.e. higher FAR). (**P<0.01,þP<0.10).
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negatively correlated with its d’a (R ¼ 0.75, P < 0.001). Similarly,
the mask contrast for the fearful/happy task showed a negative
correlation with d’a in the fearful/happy Discrimination task as
well as in the fearful/angry Discrimination task (R ¼ 0.51, P ¼
0.012; R ¼ 0.50, P ¼ 0.013). The mask contrast in the fearful/angry
Discrimination task was also negatively correlated with its discrim-
ination d’a (R¼ 0.701, P< 0.001). The mask contrast did not correl-
ate with the Discrimination criteria. The calibrated morphing
intensity of facial emotion did not correlate with Discrimination
d’a and criteria, except that the morphing intensity of a happy face
showed positive correlation with the criteria in the fearful/happy
Discrimination (R ¼ 0.55, P ¼ 0.005), indicating that participants
with stronger calibrated intensity of a happy face was more liberal
to report perceiving a happy face.
Voxel-based morphometry
The earlier analyses revealed a liberal bias to report perceiving a
fearful face in the Detection Tasks as well as in the
Discrimination Tasks. Next, we examined whether such bias
would correlate with the brain anatomy related with higher-
level cognitive processing. To do so, we analyzed whether lib-
eral criteria in fearful face perception correlates with the indi-
vidual differences in the gray matter density of DLPFC, which is
one important region for perceptual decision-making (Heekeren
et al., 2006; Philiastides et al., 2011). The correlations of percep-
tual bias with left and right DLPFC (BA9 and 46) were tested sep-
arately, given previous literatures suggesting distinctive
cognitive functions of DLPFC between the hemispheres (Kaller
et al., 2011; Barbey et al., 2013). We also analyzed whether such
liberal criteria would correlate with the gray matter density of
bilateral Amygdala, which is a critical site for fearful face per-
ception (Morris et al., 1996; Adolphs, 2008; Fusar-Poli et al., 2009).
In the subsequent analyses, we controlled for perceptual sensi-
tivity (d’a) so as to specifically examine the neural correlates of
criteria, by first removing the effects of sensitivity in regression
analyses. Specifically, we regressed out d’a from the criteria in
the corresponding task. That is, we regressed out d’a in the fear-
ful face Detection task from the criteria in the corresponding
fearful face Detection task. Likewise, we regressed out d’a in
each of the Detection tasks with an angry and happy face from
the criteria in the corresponding Detection tasks, and we then
averaged the residual criterion values between the two
Detection tasks.
First, we examined the brain structural correlates of criteria
in the Detection Tasks with left DLPFC. As Figure 4B shows,
reduced DLPFC (BA46L) density was significantly related with
more liberal criteria (i.e. <0) in detecting a fearful face (R¼ 0.414,
P¼ 0.044). Meanwhile, less dense DLPFC (BA46L) did not correl-
ate with the criteria in detecting a non-fearful (angry or happy)
face (R¼0.218, P¼ 0.306), which was the case even when the
criterion results were separately analyzed for an angry face
(R¼0.01, P¼ 0.95) and a happy face (R¼0.35, P¼ 0.10). The
two correlations, one with the fearful face detection criteria and
the other with the non-fearful face detection criteria, signifi-
cantly differed from each other [t(21)¼3.10, P¼ 0.005], as re-
vealed by a William’s t-test (Williams, 1959; Weaver and
Wuensch, 2013). This means that participants with reduced
DLPFC (BA46L) density were more likely to report perceiving a
fearful face, while they were less likely to report perceiving an
angry or happy face. Yet, the correlation between BA46L and lib-
eral criteria in detecting a fearful face should be treated as a ten-
tative result, given it would not survive a correction for multiple
comparisons (i.e. a threshold is to be adjusted as 0.025 when
compensating for testing with BA46L and BA9L). BA9L did not
show significant correlation with neither the criteria in detect-
ing a fearful face nor a non-fearful face (R¼ 0.24, P¼ 0.27;
R¼0.04, P¼ 0.85, respectively).
When focusing on right DLPFC, both right BA46R and BA9R
showed numerically similar results as BA46L, yet they were not
statistically significant.
Meanwhile, the Amygdala density correlated with the fearful
face detection criteria in the opposite manner as the DLPFC
density (Figure 4C). That is, higher Amygdala density, rather
than lower density, was related with more liberal criteria for de-
tecting a fearful face (R¼0.419, P¼ 0.041). Amygdala density
did not correlate with criteria for detecting non-fearful faces
(R¼0.082, P¼ 0.704), which was the case even when the results
were separately analyzed for an angry and happy face
(R¼0.24, P¼ 0.26; R¼ 0.11, P¼ 0.60, respectively). The two cor-
relations of the Amygdala density with a fearful and non-fearful
faces did not significantly differ from each other [t(21)¼ 1.38,
P¼ 0.181].
The correlations of detection criteria with BA46L and
Amygdala density mentioned earlier were qualitatively similar
even when d’a was not controlled for: lower BA46L density was
related with bias toward detecting a fearful face (R¼ 0.32,
P¼ 0.13), while it was not the case when detecting non-fearful
faces (R¼0.23, P¼ 0.28). Meanwhile, there was a trend that
higher Amygdala density was related with bias toward perceiv-
ing a fearful face (R¼0.36, P¼ 0.09), although there was no
such correlation between Amygdala density and bias toward
perceiving non-fearful faces (R¼0.07, P¼ 0.74).
The same correlation analyses for the criteria in
Discrimination Tasks (Supplementary Figure S1) showed similar
results as the Detection Tasks (Figure 4), although the results
were not statistically significant.
The densities of BA46L and Amygdala were not related with
the calibrated stimulus properties, as shown by lack of their cor-
relations with the morphing intensity of facial emotions
(P> 0.69) as well as the calibrated contrast of the backward
mask (P> 0.38). This rules out the possibility that the aforemen-
tioned correlations between the brain anatomical differences
and the fearful face detection criteria are explained by the dif-
ferences in the stimulus properties determined through
calibration.
Metacognitive performance
In addition to the bias at the level of perceptual decision-
making (i.e. criteria) as described earlier, we examined potential
biases in fearful face perception at the level of metacognition.
We analyzed the confidence rating as well as the metacognitive
sensitivity which was measured as response-specific meta-d’
for the response of perceiving a fearful face as well as for the re-
sponse of perceiving a non-fearful (happy/angry) face
(Maniscalco and Lau, 2014). Meta-d’ is a signal detection theor-
etic measurement of metacognitive sensitivity which quantifies
how well confidence rating can track the perceptual accuracy
(Maniscalco and Lau, 2012), such that meta-d’ becomes larger if
confidence is rated higher after a correct than incorrect percep-
tual response. Although meta-d’ quantifies the metacognitive
sensitivity independently from perceptual sensitivity (d’), meta-
d’ is calculated on the same scale as d’, enabling an intuitive in-
terpretation of meta-d’ in relation to d’ (Maniscalco and Lau,
2012). Because analysis of meta-d’ is not straightforward when
the variances between the two stimulus distributions are un-
equal (Maniscalco and Lau, 2014), we focused on the
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Discrimination Tasks where the equal variance assumption
held, as reported earlier.
First, as for confidence rating, a one-way ANOVA with a
within-subject factor of Responded emotion revealed a signifi-
cant main effect [F(2, 39)¼ 3.48, P¼ 0.04, partial g2¼ 0.15]. This
main effect was due to that confidence rating was higher when
participants responded perceiving a fearful than angry or happy
face, although the differences were only marginally significant
(P¼ 0.07, P¼ 0.08, respectively) (Figure 5A, left).
This elevated confidence for fearful face perception de-
pended on the perceptual accuracy (Figure 5A, right), as re-
vealed by a significant interaction between Perceptual Accuracy
(correct/incorrect) and Responded emotion (fearful/angry/
happy) in a repeated measures ANOVA [F(2, 39)¼ 12.92,
P< 0.001]. Participants reported higher confidence only when
they accurately perceived a fearful face (i.e. report perceiving a
fearful face when such face was actually presented) than when
they accurately perceived an angry face (P¼ 0.002, Bonferroni
corrected). They also reported higher confidence upon accurate
perception of a fearful face when compared with a happy face,
yet this difference was not significant (P¼ 0.29). There was no
such difference in confidence rating when perception was in-
correct. This interaction suggests that, when a fearful face was
perceived compared with when a non-fearful angry face was
perceived, metacognitive sensitivity was higher in that confi-
dence rating better tracked the perceptual accuracy.
Accordingly, meta-d’ significantly differed across three emo-
tions (A main effect of Emotion in one-way ANOVA, [F(2,
39)¼ 3.26, P¼ 0.049, partial g2¼0.14]), which was due to that
meta-d’ tended to be higher for the response of fearful face per-
ception than the response of angry face perception (Figure 5B)
(P¼ 0.073).
Discussion
It has been shown that fearful face perception is prioritized in
that such faces are often perceived more easily or quickly
(Milders et al., 2006; Phelps et al., 2006; Yang et al., 2007; Stein
et al., 2009, 2010, 2014; Amting et al., 2010; Stienen and de Gelder,
2011). Yet, it was unclear whether such prioritized perception of
fearful faces was merely due to bottom-up processing of low-
level physical features (Yang et al., 2007). Alternatively, it could
Fig. 4. The correlations of detection criteria with the gray matter density in BA46L (DLFCP) as well as in Amygdala. (A) ROIs for BA46L and Amygdala. (B) Reduced BA46L
density was related with more liberal criteria (i.e. smaller value) particularly for fearful face detection (i.e. bias to report perceiving a fearful face). Meanwhile, (C)
increased Amygdala density was related with more liberal criteria in fearful face detection. (*P<0.05).
Fig. 5. Enhanced metacognitive performance for fearful face discrimination. (A) When participants reported perceiving a fearful face, they tended to rate their confi-
dence to be higher, compared with when they reported perceiving a non-fearful (either angry or happy) face. More specifically, this elevated confidence for fearful face
perception was observed only when such perception was correct but not when incorrect. (B) Metacognitive sensitivity measured as meta-d’ tended to be higher when
participants responded perceiving a fearful face than an angry face. (**P<0.01,þP<0.10).
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also be case that the emotional intensity expressed in fearful
faces used by previous studies was stronger than those in other
emotions; the actors might have expressed fear in a way that
was more salient than they expressed other emotions. This
study addressed this issue explicitly by matching perceptual
sensitivity via titration of the emotional intensity in the face
stimuli. We showed that fearful face perception is biased at the
levels of perceptual decision-making and metacognition.
Specifically, participants showed liberal criteria in perceiving
a fearful face, in both Detection Tasks and Discrimination
Tasks. In addition, participants reported higher confidence
when they accurately discriminated a fearful face than an angry
or happy face. As we carefully controlled for the low-level pro-
cessing capacity of face images, the observed biases are likely to
arise from higher-level mechanisms rather than low-level vis-
ual processing. The involvement of higher-level mechanisms
was further supported by the result that the liberal bias in per-
ceiving a fearful face was stronger among individual with
reduced gray matter density in DLPFC, which is involved in
higher-level cognitive functions such as perceptual decision-
making (Heekeren et al., 2006; Philiastides et al., 2011).These are
in agreement with the view that visual perception of emotion-
ally salient visual stimuli involves multiple processing path-
ways (Tamietto et al., 2015), including the prefrontal cortex
(Morris et al., 1996; Adolphs, 2008; Fusar-Poli et al., 2009; Pessoa
and Adolphs, 2010).
In addition to its role in accumulation of sensory evidence in
perceptual decision-making, the DLPFC has also been linked to
emotional regulation (c.f., Ochsner et al., 2002), and more specif-
ically in the context of fearful face processing (Bishop et al.,
2004). For instance, one study showed greater activity in DLPFC
(BA8/9) when a fearful face was suppressed in binocular rivalry
(Amting et al., 2010). This is congruent with the current result in
suggesting that less involvement of DLPFC can lead to higher
likelihood of fearful face perception, although our interpretation
is tentative because our structural brain analysis does not allow
us to speak direct on the physiological mechanisms. Although
further studies should directly examine the exact role of DLPFC
in biasing fearful face perception, one possibility is that it re-
flects prior expectation for the likelihood of fearful face occur-
rence, as it has been shown that prior expectation relates with
perceptual bias as well as DLPFC activity (Rahnev et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, given the role of DLPFC in a variety of cogni-
tive control functions (Passingham and Wise, 2012), there could
be alternative accounts for the correlation between DLPFC and
the bias in fearful face perception. For instance, as DLPFC relates
with inhibition of irrelevant information (Suzuki and Gottlieb,
2013), its density may correlate with the participants’ tendency
to selectively focus on a single diagnostic feature for a fearful
face perception, such as an open mouth. However, this possibil-
ity may be unlikely because it would lead to a prediction that
the DLPFC density correlates with the performance of stimulus
calibration (e.g. focusing more locally on the mouth would im-
prove the calibration performance, such as lowered morphing
intensity for a fearful face), which was shown not to be the case
(see Results).
It is well known that criteria could reflect response strategy
independently from perception (Macmillan and Creelman,
2005). Given this, one trivial interpretation would be that par-
ticipants merely reported to perceive a fearful face more often,
even though they did not actually perceive that to be the case.
However, this would be curious as to why participants may do
so, given that there is no particular benefit given the task in-
structions. Importantly, criteria could also reflect differences in
perception itself, including perceptual shifts driven by visual il-
lusions (Witt et al., 2015). Likewise, another study observed lib-
eral criteria for detection in the peripheral vision, and the
authors argued that this reflects the inflated subjective sense of
perception in the periphery (Solovey et al., 2015). Perhaps the
current results likewise reflect biases at the perceptual level.
This interpretation is congruent with the results on metacogni-
tive bias too, especially because perceptual confidence and
metacognition have been argued to reflect conscious awareness
(Lau and Rosenthal, 2011).
Another limitation of this study was that we used the face
images of only two models. We chose to use such a small image
set to carefully match perceptual sensitivity (d’a) across the
tasks, which was necessary to control for lower-level visual pro-
cessing. If we had used a larger image set, it would have been
difficult to control for the variance of fearful face signal, as well
as to match perceptual sensitivity carefully. However, although
we used face images of only two models, liberal criteria in fear-
ful face perception did not differ between the models, in both
Detection Tasks and Discrimination Tasks [i.e. interaction of
Emotion or Emotion Pair with Model; F(1, 63)¼ 1.03, P¼ 0.32; F(1,
63)¼ 0.15, P¼ 0.70, respectively], suggesting these results may
generalize. Yet, given that the face images were tightly cali-
brated prior to Detection and Discrimination tasks, participants
may have learned some strategies specific to the characteristics
of the face images used (e.g. mouth configuration). Moreover,
such learning may have taken place particularly for the fearful
faces, given that a fearful face contains unique local features
such as an open mouth, and that the emotion of fear generally
facilitates learning (LeDoux, 1996). However, this learning effect
is unlikely to explain the liberal bias in fearful face detection be-
cause such bias involves not only enhanced perception of a
fearful face but also increased false alarm in perceiving non-
fearful faces as fearful. The increase in false alarm cannot be ex-
plained by the potentially learned strategies specific to the fear-
ful faces. Nevertheless, given that a small image set is certainly
a limitation in this study, future studies may examine the gen-
eralizability of our findings with different image sets.
To conclude, future work should benefit by addressing the
current limitations by using fMRI where one could directly
examine the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the
observed biases, as well as by using a wider variety of face
images to further ensure the generalizability of the results. Yet,
this study presents an initial step toward uncovering the mech-
anisms as high up in the prefrontal cortex that bias the percep-
tion of fearful face, particularly at the levels perceptual
decision-making and metacognition.
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